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1. Introduction
We analyze Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in an asymmetric oligopoly in
which the firms produce differentiated substitutable goods and seek to maximize
their relative profits instead of their absolute profits. Firms in an industry not only
seek to improve their own performance but also want to outperform the rival firms.
TV audience-rating race and market share competition by breweries, automobile
manufacturers, convenience store chains and mobile-phone carriers, especially in
Japan, are examples of such behavior of firms1.
In the next section we present the model, in Section 3 and 4 we investigate
the outputs and prices at Bertrand and Cournot equilibria, and in Section 5 we
compare Bertrand and Cournot equilibria. In Section 6 we mention some related
results in other works.
2. The model
There are n = 2 firms. They produce differentiated substitutable goods. The
output and the price of the good of Firm i are denoted by xi and pi . The inverse
demand functions of the goods are
pi D a   xi   b
nX
jD1;j¤i
xj ; i D 1; 2; : : : ; n; (1)
We assume a > 0 and 0 < b < 1. From (1) we obtain the following ordinary
demand functions (See Appendix 1).
xi D 1
.1   b/1C .n   1/b

.1   b/a   1C .n   2/bpi (2)
C b
nX
jD1;j¤i
pj

; i D 1; 2; : : : ; n:
The inverse and ordinary demand functions are symmetric for the firms.
3. Cournot equilibrium under relative profit maximization
1For analyses about relative profit maximization please see Schaffer (1989), Gibbons and
Murphy (1990), Lu (2011) and Matsumura et. al. (2013).
In this section we assume that each firm determines its output given the outputs
of other firms so as to maximize its relative profit. Let denote the absolute profit
of Firm i by i . Then,
i D
0@a   xi   b nX
jD1;j¤i
xj
1A xi   cixi ; i D 1; 2; : : : ; n:
The relative profit of Firm i is defined as the difference between its absolute profit
and the average of the absolute profits of other firms. Denote it byi . Then,
i D
0@a   xi   b nX
jD1;j¤i
xj
1A xi   cixi
  1
n   1
nX
jD1;j¤i
240@a   xj   b nX
kD1;k¤j
xk
1A xj   cjxj
35 ; i D 1; 2; : : : ; n:
Differentiating i with respect to xi for each i , the conditions for relative profit
maximization are obtained as follows.
a   2xi   ci   .n   2/b
n   1
nX
jD1;j¤i
xj D 0; i D 1; 2; : : : ; n: (3)
From this, we have
xi D n   1
2.n   1/   .n   2/b .a   ci/  
.n   2/b
2.n   1/   .n   2/b
nX
jD1
xj ;
and
na   2
nX
jD1
xi  
nX
jD1
ci   .n   2/b
nX
jD1
xi D 0:
The latter equation means
nX
jD1
xi D 1
2C .n   2/b
0@na   nX
jD1
ci
1A :
Then, we get the equilibrium output of Firm i as follows.
xCi D
n   1
2.n   1/   .n   2/b .a   ci/
  .n   2/b
2.n   1/   .n   2/b2C .n   2/b
0@na   nX
jD1
ci
1A ; i D 1; 2; : : : ; n:
C indicates Cournot. The equilibrium price of the good of Firm i is
pCi Da   xCi   b
nX
jD1;j¤i
xCj D
n   1C b
2.n   1/   .n   2/b .a   ci/
  nb
2.n   1/   .n   2/b2C .n   2/b
0@na   nX
jD1
cj
1AC ci ; i D 1; 2; : : : ; n:
4. Bertrand equilibrium under relative profit maximization
In this section each firm determines the price of its good given the prices of
the goods of other firms so as to maximize its relative profit. The absolute profit
of Firm i is written as
i D 1
.1   b/1C .n   1/b
24.1   b/a   1C .n   2/bpi C b nX
jD1;j¤i
pj
35 .pi ci/:
The relative profit of Firm i is
i D 1
.1   b/1C .n   1/b
24.1   b/a   1C .n   2/bpi C b nX
jD1;j¤i
pj
35 .pi   ci/
  1
.1   b/.n   1/1C .n   1/b
nX
jD1;j¤i
(
.1   b/a   1C .n   2/bpj
C b
nX
kD1;k¤j
pk
)
.pj   cj /:
Differentiatingi with respect to pi , the conditions for relative profit maximiza-
tion are obtained as follows.
.1   b/a   21C .n   2/bpi C b
nX
jD1;j¤i
pj C 1C .n   2/bci (4)
  b
n   1
nX
jD1;j¤i
.pj   cj / D 0; i D 1; 2; : : : ; n:
Then, we get the equilibrium price of the good of Firm i as follows (See Appendix
2).
pBi D
.n   1/1C .n   1/b
2.n   1/C .n   2/.2n   1/b .a   ci/
  nb1C .n   2/b
2.n   1/C .n   2/.2n   1/b2C .n   2/b
0@na   nX
jD1
cj
1AC ci ;
i D 1; 2; : : : ; n:
B indicates Bertrand. The equilibrium output of Firm i is
xBi D
1
.1   b/1C .n   1/b
(
1C .n   1/b.a   ci/   1C .n   1/b.pi   ci/
  b
0@na   nX
jD1
cj
1AC b nX
jD1
.pj   cj /
)
D n   1C .n
2   3nC 1/b
.1   b/2.n   1/C .n   2/.2n   1/b.a   ci/
  .n   2/1C .n   1/bb
.1   b/2.n   1/C .n   2/.2n   1/b2C .n   2/b
0@na   nX
jD1
cj
1A ;
i D 1; 2; : : : ; n:
5. Comparison of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria
Let us compare the outputs and prices at the Bertrand equilibrium and those at
the Cournot equilibrium. Comparing the output of Firm i at the Bertrand equilib-
rium and that at the Cournot equilibrium,
xBi   xCi D
n.n   2/b2.PnjD1 cj   nci/
.1   b/2.n   1/C .n   2/.2n   1/b2.n   1/   .n   2/b : (5)
Comparing the price of the good of Firm i at the Bertrand equilibrium and that at
the Cournot equilibrium,
pBi   pCi D
n.n   2/b2.nci  PnjD1 cj /
2.n   1/C .n   2/.2n   1/b2.n   1/   .n   2/b : (6)
Assume that n  3. From (5) we find that xBi D xCi if and only if ci DPn
jD1 cj
n
. Also from (6) pBi D pCi if and only if ci D
Pn
jD1 cj
n
.
If ci <
Pn
jD1 cj
n
we have xBi > x
C
i and p
B
i < p
C
i . And if ci >
Pn
jD1 cj
n
we
have xBi < x
C
i and p
B
i > p
C
i .
But if n D 2, we have xBi D xCi and pBi D pCi for i D 1; 2, even if c1 > c2
or c1 < c2.
Therefore, we obtain the following results2.
Proposition 1 For n D 2, that is, in a duopoly the Cournot equilibrium and the
Bertrand equilibrium are equivalent.
For n = 3, that is, in an oligopoly with more than two firms if the marginal
cost of a firm is lower than the average marginal cost over the industry, its output
at the Bertrand equilibrium is larger than that at the Cournot equilibrium, and
the price of its good at the Bertrand equilibrium is lower than that at the Cournot
equilibrium.
On the other hand, if the marginal cost of a firm is higher than the average
marginal cost over the industry, its output at the Bertrand equilibrium is smaller
than that at the Cournot equilibrium, and the price of its good at the Bertrand
equilibrium is higher than that at the Cournot equilibrium.
Comparing the first order conditions for relative profit maximization in the
Cournot oligopoly and those in the Bertrand oligopoly, we can provide the reason
why the equivalence of the Cournot equilibrium and the Bertrand equilibrium
holds in a duopoly and a symmetric oligopoly. In a duopoly, since n D 2 the
2Note that if firms are symmetric with respect to c, Cournot and Bertrand equilibria coincide.
first order conditions for relative profit maximization in the Cournot oligopoly,
(3), are reduced to
@1
@x1
D a   2x1   c1 D 0; and @2
@x2
D a   2x2   c2 D 0; (7)
and the first order conditions for relative profit maximization in the Bertrand
oligopoly, (4), are reduced to
@1
@p1
D .1   b/a   2p1 C c1 C bc2 D 0; (8–1)
@2
@p2
D .1   b/a   2p2 C c2 C bc1 D 0: (8–2)
Alternatively these are written as
@1
@p1
D @1
@x1
@x1
@p1
C @1
@x2
@x2
@p1
D 0; @2
@p2
D @2
@x1
@x1
@p2
C @2
@x2
@x2
@p2
D 0: (9)
From the property of the relative profits the following relation holds.
2 D  1: (10)
Then, (9) is rewritten as
@1
@p1
D @1
@x1
@x1
@p1
  @2
@x2
@x2
@p1
D 0; @2
@p2
D  @1
@x1
@x1
@p2
C @2
@x2
@x2
@p2
D 0: (11)
Substituting the inverse demand functions into (8–1) and (8–2) yields
.1 b/a 2.a x1 bx2/Cc1Cbc2 D 0; and .1 b/a 2.a x2 bx1/Cc2Cbc1 D 0:
Arranging the terms, we obtain
a 2x1 c1Cb.a 2x2 c2/ D 0; and a 2x2 c2Cb.a 2x1 c1/ D 0: (12)
They are equivalent to (11) because, if n D 2, @x1
@p1
D @x2
@p2
D   1
1 b2 and
@x2
@p1
D
@x2
@p1
D b
1 b2 . Since b ¤ 1, (12) implies (7).
In the case where n = 3 a relation such as (10) does not holds.
But, if the marginal costs of all firms are equal, a similar relation holds at the
equilibrium. At the Cournot equilibrium all xi ’s are equal, and then the first order
conditions are reduced to
a   2C .n   2/bxi   ci D 0: (13)
At the Bertrand equilibrium all pi ’s are equal, and then the first order conditions
are reduced to
.1   b/a   2C .n   2/bpi C 1C .n   1/bci D 0: (14)
Alternatively this is written as
@i
@pi
D @i
@xi
@xi
@pi
C .n   1/@i
@xj
@xj
@pi
D 0; j ¤ i: (15)
From the property of the relative profits the following relation holds.
.n   1/@j
@xi
D .n   1/@i
@xj
D  @i
@xi
D  fa   2C .n   2/bxi   cig;
and we have
@xi
@pi
D   1C .n   2/b
.1   b/1C .n   1/b ;
@xj
@pi
D b
.1   b/1C .n   1/b
for j ¤ i at the equilibrium of a symmetric oligopoly. Thus, (15) is rewritten as
1C .n   1/b
.1   b/1C .n   1/b

@i
@xi
D 0; j ¤ i: (16)
From the inverse demand functions
pi D a   1C .n   1/bxi :
Substituting this into (14) yields
.1   b/a   2C .n   2/bfa   1C .n   1/bxig C 1C .n   1/bci D 0:
Arranging the terms, we obtain
a  2C .n 2/bxi  ciC .n 1/bfa  2C .n 2/bxi  cig D 0; j ¤ i: (17)
This is equivalent to (16). Since 1C .n   1/b ¤ 0, it implies (13).
6. Related results
Absolute profit maximization If firms in an oligopoly seek to maximize their
absolute profits, the Bertrand and Cournot equilibria do not coincide whether the
goods of firms are differentiated or homogeneous. It was widely known that in
a duopoly if the goods of the firms are substitutes, the equilibrium outputs at the
Cournot equilibrium are larger than those at the Bertrand equilibrium, and if the
goods are complements, we have the converse results.
In contrast to these results in absolute profit maximization case, in the current
paper we have shown that when firms maximize their relative profits, even if the
goods of the firms are substitutes, the equilibrium output at the Cournot equilib-
riummay be larger than or smaller than or equal to that at the Bertrand equilibrium
depending on the relationship among marginal costs of the firms.
Relative profit maximization with a homogeneous good By Vega-Redondo
(1997), in a framework of evolutionary game theoretic model, it was shown that
in an oligopoly in which firms produce a homogeneous good and seek to maximize
their relative profits, the Cournot equilibrium coincide with the outcome of perfect
competition. Referring to Alchian (1950) and Friedman (1953) he argued that it
is relative rather than absolute performance which should in the end prove decisive
in the long run.
With differentiated goods, however, the Cournot equilibrium under relative
profit maximization is not equivalent to perfect competition.
Delegation problem Miller and Pazgal (2001) has shown the equivalence of
price strategy and quantity strategy in a delegation game when owners of firms
control managers of firms seek to maximize an appropriate combination of abso-
lute and relative profits. Also Kockesen et. al. (2000) showed that in a two-stage
game where the owners of firms choose the weight on the relative profit of the
objective functions of their firms and then firms face quantity competition, the
owners choose positive weight on the relative profit, but pure relative profit maxi-
mization yields the lowest equilibrium (absolute) profits.
In their analyses the owners of firms themselves still seek to maximize ab-
solute profits of their firms. On the contrary, we have interest in the case where
the owners of firms themselves seek to maximize the (pure) relative profits. The
relative profit is not a means to control the firms, but itself is an object of the
owners.
Symmetric and asymmetric duopoly In Tanaka (2013), assuming linear de-
mand functions and constant marginal costs, it was shown that in a duopoly with
differentiated goods, if firms have the same cost function and maximize their rel-
ative profits, Bertrand and Cournot equilibria are equivalent in the sense that the
output and the price of each firm’s good at the Bertrand equilibrium are equal to
those at the Cournot equilibrium. Satoh and Tanaka (2014) has extended this
result to a case where firms have different cost functions.
The result of this paper is an extension and generalization of these results in a
duopoly to an asymmetric oligopoly.
Appendix 1: Calculations of the ordinary demand functions
For j ¤ i , we have
pj D a   xj   bxi   b
nX
kD1;k¤i;j
xk:
Thus,
nX
jD1;j¤i
pj D .n   1/a   .n   1/bxi   1C .n   2/b
nX
jD1;j¤i
xj :
From this
nX
jD1;j¤i
xj D 1
1C .n   2/b
24.n   1/a   .n   1/bxi   nX
jD1;j¤i
pj
35 :
Substituting this into (1),
xi D a   pi   b
1C .n   2/b
24.n   1/a   .n   1/bxi   nX
jD1;j¤i
pj
35 :
Then, we obtain the following ordinary demand functions.
xi D 1
.1   b/1C .n   1/b
24.1   b/a   1C .n   2/bpi C b nX
jD1;j¤i
pj
35 ;
i D 1; 2; : : : ; n:
Appendix 2: Calculations of the Bertrand equilibrium prices
(4) is rewritten as
1C .n   2/b.a   ci/   21C .n   2/b.pi   ci/C b
nX
jD1;j¤i
.pj   cj /
  b
24.n   1/a   nX
jD1;j¤i
cj
35   b
n   1
nX
jD1;j¤i
.pj   cj / D 0; i D 1; 2; : : : ; n:
From this we obtain
pi   ci D n   1
2.n   1/C .n   2/.2n   1/b
8<:1C .n   1/b.a   ci/   b
0@na   nX
jD1
cj
1A9=;
C .n   2/b
2.n   1/C .n   2/.2n   1/b
nX
jD1
.pj   cj /;
and
1C .n   2/b
0@na   nX
jD1
ci
1A   21C .n   2/b nX
jD1
.pi   ci/C .n   1/b
nX
jD1
.pi   ci/
  .n   1/b
0@na   nX
jD1
ci
1A   b nX
jD1
.pi   ci/ D 0:
The latter equation means
nX
jD1
.pi   ci/ D 1   b
2C .n   2/b
0@na   nX
jD1
ci
1A :
Then, we get the equilibrium price of the good of Firm i as follows.
pBi D
.n   1/1C .n   1/b
2.n   1/C .n   2/.2n   1/b .a   ci/
  nb1C .n   2/b
2.n   1/C .n   2/.2n   1/b2C .n   2/b
0@na   nX
jD1
cj
1AC ci ;
i D 1; 2; : : : ; n:
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